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Hester Lessard Equality and Access to
Justice in the Work of Bertha
Wilson*
Increasingly, Canadians have sought to understand themselves as a
community through the language of equality rights. There are several
practical and theoretical consequences to this choice of language. One
of the practical consequences is that a formal commitment to equality
raises public consciousness with regard to material and social dispari-
ties and to some extent gives those who are excluded or marginalized
at least a rhetorical claim to participation and a share in resources.
However, another consequence is that while promoting a rhetoric of
respect and individual dignity, equality discourse also places a dispro-
portionate amount of power in the hands of elite groups, namely the
courts, lawyers, and social groups who have access to courts and
lawyers. The dissonance persists on a theoretical level. The recourse
to the language of equality rights can be regarded as a shift away from
a notion of community in which hierarchy is based on status and on
the exploitation of need to a notion of community in which need is the
occasion for the democratization of social and material goods. Con-
versely, equality rights discourse can also represent a shift to a notion
of community in which hierarchy is the natural outcome of competi-
tion between individuals who share the same opportunities. What is
confusing is that the language of equality rights retains tremendous
force and power, and yet when translated into social arrangements, it
can have contradictory practical consequences, and can signify con-
tradictory visions of community.
The parallel with the Scottish debates concerning educational
policy and the theory of the democratic intellect illustrates the point,
and perhaps offers a lesson. At the center of the debates lay a very
important social good, education, and, as well, a powerful social myth,
what Robert Anderson in his essay on Scottish educational history
calls the "myth of the lad of parts".1 The myth symbolized the social
diversity and democratic character of Scottish education in contrast to
that of its more class conscious neighbour to the south. However,
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eventually the myth was captured by a conservative social ideology
that saw education not as a means of empowerment and eradicating
class hierarchy but as a strategy to preserve social stratification by
providing limited mobility for the few. In Anderson's account, Scot-
tish educational policy in the nineteenth century entrenched the ideals
of merit and equal opportunity in conjunction with an educational
system based on competition for credentials which in practical terms
were accessible only to the privileged. A few hardy male souls, at
great cost to their health, were able to work their way up from the
lower schools to the universities and professional classes. These 'lads
of parts' came to represent Scotland's commitment to the democratic
character of Scottish education. They were proof that middle and
upper classes had power, wealth and position because they deserved
it. In the name of upholding standards, education became specialized
and accessible only to those who managed to climb the ladder con-
structed of secondary schooling and entrance examinations. Mean-
while, the other side of the myth, its communitarian and egalitarian
face which would have seen higher education accessible to all and
produced a literate and articulate working class, was lost. Thus, in
Anderson's account, the democratic tradition in educational policy
had many contested meanings. On the one hand, it meant the social
prosperity of every member of the community and their political
enfranchisement in both substantive and procedural terms. On the
other, it portrayed social progress and prosperity as the inevitable
outcome of a process of social exchange in which the same rules apply
to all. The former meaning required an attention to the diversity of
individual and social needs, while the latter required a focus on the
even handed application of uniform standards.
Anderson's deconstructive method as well as his story about the
struggle over the meaning of equality in education is particularly
relevant to the struggle within legal discourse over the meaning of
equality rights. One can trace the same conflicting images of commu-
nity and the same conflicting strategic options and practical conse-
quences. Furthermore, Anderson's focus on the mythic power of the
"lad of parts" invites speculation on the way cultural symbols are
defined and deployed to maintain particular social structures and
particular arrangements of power and wealth. If one examines legal
discourse as a social and institutional practice through which cultural
myths are produced and controlled, it is possible to argue that law is a
way of organizing knowledge about the world that is founded on
exclusion. Three gambits neatly dovetail to provide a framework
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designed to perpetuate rather than challenge existing distributions of
power: the epistemological move whereby knowledge of the particu-
lar is universalized and all other knowledges portrayed as subjective
and partial, the normative move whereby the moral domain and the
human self are defined in terms of the ideals of autonomy and disen-
gagement, and the methodological move whereby abstract concepts
like freedom and equality are invoked to preserve the freedom of
social inequalities. It is only by unpacking the links between knowl-
edge production, values, and methodology that one begins to see the
shape that resistance might take.
This brings me to a critical question: what is a judge committed to
substantive equality and access to justice in the substantive sense, to
do? The answer is, she takes great risks, in particular, she counters the
exclusionary epistemological, normative, and methodological moves
of legal discourse wherever possible. The work of Bertha Wilson
reveals the difficulty of that task. In preparing for this essay, I focused
on those judgments in which I thought I could see most clearly the
effort to transform established categories in order to make them more
inclusive and responsive to the diversity of needs within the Canadian
community. This involved looking not just at cases which explicitly
address the content of equality, but also at decisions which reflect on
the discursive and analytic moves required by litigation and the ways
in which they silence less powerful groups and delegitimize their
claims. Consequently, I would like to divide my remarks into three
parts. In the first part, I shall examine the epistemological strategies
embarked upon by Justice Wilson, in particular her challenge to the
notion of law's objectivity. In the second part, I will discuss the
normative commitment to equality that flows from an epistemology
that situates knowledge and knowers in experience and history. And
finally, I will look at the discursive and methodological moves em-
ployed by Justice Wilson.
I Epistemological Strategies: Who is this Ordinary Person
anyway?
The ordinary person, once the reasonable man, might be said to be
law's "lad of parts" insofar as it is the vehicle whereby the perspec-
tives and interests of a particularly powerful group in Canadian soci-
ety are presented as the perspectives and interests of all. The law
relies on the ordinary person for objectivity. It is presumed that
ordinary people act reasonably and that judges can determine what
that means in a particular situation because they themselves are rea-
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sonable people. Thus, they avoid imposing their own code of behav-
iour on litigants, but instead apply general principles of normal decent
behaviour that pertain to all. While very few judges take time to
examine how they arrive at their knowledge of those principles, an
unarticulated epistemology of objectivism underlies judicial reliance
on the reasonable or ordinary person. Epistemologies function in part
as justificatory strategies. They explain why one knowledge claim is
valid and another is not. Objectivism asserts that validity can only be
achieved "through dispassionate, disinterested, value free, point of
viewless, objective inquiry procedures."2 Conversely, subjective, par-
ticularized, socially positioned claims are invalid; they do not count as
truth. At most they are opinion. The rigidity of the objective/subjec-
tive dualism as well as its hierarchical positive/negative, universalist/
particularist inter-relationship makes it very difficult to deconstruct. It
signifies not merely the difference between truth and non-truth, but
also the divide between moral legitimacy and moral arbitrariness. The
judge who resolves conflicts objectively, acts according to principle
rather than personal preference. If one departs from the objectivity of
the ordinary person's perspective, one opens oneself up to being
consigned to the negative 'subjective' side of the dualism and to
charges of being unprincipled, biased, or at best, if one is a litigant,
someone whose flawed nature requires compassion or indulgence.
Furthermore, a question about the notion of objectivity itself is a
question about the moral legitimacy of legal decisions and the institu-
tional and political legitimacy of courts. Thus any challenge to law's
epistemology must ultimately confront the anti-democratic nature of
the judicial institution. This is the problem which underlies the
discussion of provocation in R. v. Hill.3
Gordon Hill was a teenager who fell asleep one night on the couch
of his mentor in a voluntary "Big Brother" programme in Belleville,
Ontario. According to his account, he awoke a few hours later to find
Verne Pegg, his mentor in the programme, caressing him. In his
shock, he struck Pegg with a hatchet and shortly afterwards, when
Pegg threatened to kill him, Hill fatally stabbed him. Hill was sixteen
at the time; Pegg was thirty two. Hill was convicted of second degree
murder. On appeal, Hill argued that the trial judge misinstructed the
jury on the defence of provocation which if successfully made out,
2. Sandra Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques", in Linda Nicolson
and Nancy Fraser (eds.), FeminisrdPostnwdernism (New York: Routledge,1990) at p. 87.
3. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313, 25 C.C.C. (3d) 322 (Wilson . dissenting)[hereinafter Hill cited to
c.c.c.].
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would have reduced the charge to manslaughter. What the trial judge
said was that the jury was to consider first whether Pegg's words were
"such as would deprive an ordinary person of self-control."4 Only
when the jury reached the next question, whether in fact Hill acted on
the provocation and did so "on the sudden before there was time for
his passion to cool", 5 could it consider "the mental, the emotional, the
physical characteristics and the age of this accused. ' 6 The first ques-
tion the law describes as objective; the second is considered subjec-
tive. Hill argued that age and sex should be factored in to the first
question. Hill, in other words, challenged the claim to objectivity of
the first question. He suggested that in order to make the first question
truly objective, the jury should apply the standard of self control of an
ordinary person of his age and sex.
The majority at the Supreme Court agreed but did not think that
the judge needed to explicitly instruct the jury to that effect. So the
appeal was dismissed and Hill's conviction for second degree murder
upheld. The jury would have the "collective good sense"7 to figure
out that age, sex, race, and physical ability can be important "contex-
tual consideration[s]" in arriving at an objective determination of
how the ordinary person would react.
Unfortunately, the case law on provocation is replete with exam-
ples of judges who collectively are presumed to have not only good
sense but also expertise, consistently refusing to situate the ordinary
person in anything but a white, male, heterosexual, able-bodied per-
spective. What are the options for a judge who wishes to challenge
years of judicial common sense? She might say those cases were
wrong but now we know better and can rely on the good sense of triers
of fact generally to know better - the majority position. Or, she might
challenge the artificiality of a notion of objectivity which factors in the
particular attributes of the accused, and question the way in which we
organize and give respect to some kinds of knowledge while disparag-
ing others.
Justice Wilson in her dissent in Hill does neither. She agrees that
the discussion has to be contextualized but not that we can rely on the
good sense of the jury to do so without explicit instructions. Thus, she
would send the question of Hill's guilt back to be determined at trial.
4. IbUl p. 343.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibi.
7. Ibid p.335.
8. IbN p. 336.
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However she is also careful to preserve the ordinary person's claim of
objectivity and the legitimacy that this confers both on the judicial
process and on Hill's behaviour. She suggests that there are two sides
to the question regarding the ordinary person's self-control in the
provocation defence. The first aspect focuses on the level of self
control and is characterized as "objective" in order to ensure equality
of responsibility. Thus Wilson J. leaves in place the link between
objectivity and legitimacy, between the objectivist epistemological
stance and the moral principle that all members of the community
ought to be equally responsible for each other's physical security. The
only exception that she would make to this "objective" stance is on
account of age - and this because the law has traditionally recognized
lesser abilities and lesser responsibilities for the young. Youth thus
becomes a liability or disadvantage, something we should perhaps
indulge on occasion, a manifestation of otherness. Justice Wilson
refuses to place gender, race, or other particular attributes in the same
paternalistic framework. However, she suggests that the second as-
pect of the ordinary person's self control involves assessing the grav-
ity of the particular insult. This cannot be done without referring to
the context in which the insult occurs, including the relationship
between the parties, their age, culture, physical and mental attributes.
This approach might be described as taking the law on its own
terms - leaving the formal distinction between objective and subjec-
tive and its epistemological and political significance in place - while
creating a space for telling different sorts of stories about what ordi-
nariness means, through the device of yet another distinction. By
refusing to factor sex or race or culture into the objective question of
what is the self control of an ordinary person, she avoids the paternal-
ism of special categories of ordinariness for the enumerated and
unenumerated "others" of equality discourse. More importantly, in a
legal culture that links legitimacy with universalism, the preservation
of the objective calculus of what constitutes self control, makes it
possible for courts to take account of broader social commitments
through the language of principle. One of the concerns raised by the
Hill case is that the factual situation and resulting legal rule play into
social tolerance of violence against gays and lesbians. Thus,
contextualizing what ordinariness means in the Pegg-Hill situation
must also mean taking account of law's responsibility in condoning
homophobia and violence against gays and lesbians. One must ask the
question, to what extent does Hill implicitly create an exception for
assaults on homosexuals rather than a rule which permits more room
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to consider the social factors which contribute to the vulnerability of
defendants? An objective standard can serve to mask a balancing of
social values and individual plight. However, because the balancing
is submerged in the discourse of principle and reason, there is no way
to directly speak to what is at stake. Thus, in Hill, Justice Wilson
avoids the larger project of developing an epistemological stance
which openly recognizes the social and historical positioning of indi-
viduals as well as the wider impacts of placing that positioning at the
center of the decision.
One is left questioning whether that larger project can really be
avoided. Can one actually unravel the connection between the ac-
cused's level of self control and the gravity of the insult, and thus
maintain the objectivity of the former calculation apart from the
subjective and contextual considerations of situation and relationship?
I would suggest not. Rather, once one recognises the situatedness of
what one has described as "objective", I think that one has to question
the objective/subjective distinction itself, and in particular the moral
and political consequences of labelling one set of perspectives objec-
tive, and the other subjective. However, I believe that Justice Wilson's
decision in Hill reveals a willingness to raise such questions and she
begins to develop answers in subsequent cases.
Perhaps the clearest glimpse of what an altemative epistemologi-
cal stance might look like can be seen in R. v. Morgentaler,9 a case
dealing with the constitutionality of the abortion provisions in the
Criminal Code. In Morgentaler, Justice Wilson for the most part
leaves the normative framework of legal discourse intact. In finding
that women's liberty interests are implicated in decisions about repro-
duction, she uses the language of privacy, autonomy and boundaries.
In addition, she relies on the transparency to reason of moral principle
as justification. The truth of the assertion that the state should not
compel a woman to take a pregnancy to term is founded on the
universal moral principle that human beings should not be used as
means to a state ordained end. However, in explaining why the
Constitution should protect those decisions from interference, a very
different picture, not only of the self and social relationship but also of
how knowledge is produced, emerges. She writes:
This decision is one that will have profound psychological economic
and social consequences for the pregnant woman. The circumstances
9. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 44 D.LR. (4th) 385 [hereinafterMorgentaler cited to S.C.R.].
42 The Dalhousie Law Journal
giving rise to it can complex and varied and there may be, and usually
are, powerful considerations militating in opposite directions. It is a
decision that deeply reflects the way the woman thinks about herself
and her relationship to others and to society at large. It is not just a
medical decision; it is a profound social and ethical one as well. Her
response to it will be the response of the whole person. ...It is probably
impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively, to such a di-
lemma not just because it is outside the realm of his personal experi-
ence (although this is, of course, the case) but because he can relate to
it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminating the subjective elements of
the female psyche which are at the heart of the dilemma.'"
Epistemic justification is predicated not on a claim of universal
rationality but on the subjective experience of the claimant in making
a decision that has a multitude of personal, social and ethical conse-
quences.
The questions raised by Hill and Morgentaler reassert themselves
in R. v. Lavallee.1" In that case, the issue on appeal is whether expert
testimony is admissible to assist the trier of fact in determining whether
an accused who has been in a battering relationship with her partner
can claim self defence against a charge of killing her partner. The
evidence was that the accused had shot her partner in the head as he
was leaving the room after allegedly slapping and hitting her, and
threatening to kill her if she did not kill him first. In order to make a
successful claim of self defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code,
an accused must have acted reasonably. She must have reasonably
apprehended death or grievous bodily harm at the hands of the de-
ceased and she must have had a reasonable belief that she could not
otherwise save herself from death or grievous harm other than by
shooting the deceased. As in Hill, an objective standard of reasonable
behaviour ensures fairness and equality in the application of the law.
Justice Wilson for the Court finds that the trial judge did not err in
admitting expert testimony. In so doing she expands on what the
standard of reasonableness entails. She points out that it has tradition-
ally been described in terms of what "the ordinary man using ordinary
care" might do in the same circumstances. However, she goes on to
observe:
...If it strains credulity to imagine what the "ordinary man" would do in
the position of a battered spouse, it is probably because men do not
typically find themselves in that situation. Some women do, however.
10. Ibid. at 171.
11. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852, 55 C.C.C (3d) 97 [hereinafter Lavallee cited to C.C.C.].
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The definition of what is reasonable must be adapted to circumstances
which are, by and large, foreign to the world inhabited by the hypo-
thetical "reasonable man".1
Part of what is foreign is the historical reality of years of sex
discrimination 13, "the cumulative effects of months or years of brutal-
ity"'14, the heightened sensitivity of the accused to the distinction
between typical violence and non-typical life threatening violence in
her partner's behaviour', physical disparities in size and strength'6,
women's socialization and lack of physical training in dealing with
aggression 7, and the psychological phenomena of learned helpless-
ness and traumatic bonding 8 . Ultimately, the standard to be applied
is not the "outsider's" standard but "what the accused reasonably
perceived given her situation and experience."' 9
As in Hill, Justice Wilson preserves the claim of objectivity and
reasonableness thus avoiding the paternalism of an exception or a
special category of rationality for battered women that is different
from ordinary reasonable behaviour. However, unlike Hill, she does
not create an additional distinction in order to provide room for what
the law would consider to be subjective considerations. Her assertion
is that Lyn Lavallee acted reasonably, that rationality is a function of
situation and experience, and implicitly, that there are different
rationalities. There is no longer a single reasonable standard from
which we can measure deviations and tack on exceptions or which we
can correct for bias when we come across new information. In
addition, individual plight is discussed in terms of broader social
concerns. The case is easier than Hill because the two are not at odds.
Lavallee's situation mirrors wider systemic imbalances between men
and women, whereas Hill's claim threatens to reinforce the social
marginalization and vulnerability of gays and lesbians. However,
Lavallee provides the framework for having a fuller discussion of the
intersections of difference entailed in Hill's defence and for using
legal language to mediate rather than obscure differences.
What is not addressed, is the recurring question about legitimacy.
Lavallee brings us to that threshold. At what point does the fracturing
12. Ibid. p. 114.
13. Ibid. p.115.
14. Ibid. p.118.
15. Ibid. p. 119.
16. Ibid. p. 120.
17. Ibid. p. 120.
18. Ibid. pp. 122-23.
19. Ibid. p. 120.
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of a monologic notion of reason also fracture its legitimizing function
within the institutional and analytic frameworks of the legal system?
More importantly, are there cultural, social, and historical differences
that cannot be adapted to the discursive and analytic constraints of
legal reasoning, that cannot be translated through analogy or expert
evidence into an account that allows the judge to mediate between the
litigant's circumstances and experiences, and social norms of respon-
sibility and care?
An answer to this last question is provided by R. v. Horseman. 20
In Horseman, unlike Hill, Morgentaler, and Lavallee, there is a princi-
ple of interpretation that requires the judicial interpreter to examine
the issue through the lens of the defendant's historical experience and
cultural understandings. The defendant in Horseman was a member
of the Horse Lakes Indian Band. His ancestors and those of the Band
were a party to a Treaty in 1899 which established their right to
"pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing"2' within
a certain area of land. In 1930, Canada and Alberta entered into an
agreement dealing with the transfer of control over natural resources
in Alberta from Canada to Alberta. Paragraph 12 of the Transfer
Agreement provided that the "Indians of the Province ...shall have the
right, which the Province hereby assures to them, of hunting, trapping,
and fishing game and fish for food at all seasons of the year on all
unoccupied Crown lands and on any other lands to which the said
Indians may have a right of access."22 In 1983, Horseman shot and
killed a grizzly bear in self defence within the treaty area. A year later,
he sold the grizzly hide in order to purchase food for himself and his
family. As a result, he was charged under the Alberta Wildlife Act3
with trafficking in wildlife. Horseman based his defence on Treaty
No. 8. He argued that the rights in Treaty No. 8 encompass the right
to kill a grizzly bear for food on Crown lands or lands to which the
Band has access or to sell the hide of such a grizzly bear in order to
purchase food. He further argued that the 1930 Transfer Agreement
did not derogate from the rights in Treaty No. 8.
The means by which provincial hunting laws are in general made
applicable to what would otherwise be a federal jurisdiction under
20. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901 [hereinafter Horseman].
21. Treaty No. 8 (1899) [hereinafter Treaty No. 8].
22. Natural Resources Transfer Agreement [confirmed by the Constitution Act 1930], para. 12
[hereinafter 1930 Transfer Agreement].
23. R.S.A. 1980, c. W-9, ss. l(s), 42. Section 42 states: "No person shall traffic in any wildlife
except as is expressly permitted by this Act or by the regulations." Section I(s) states: "...traffic
means any single act of sellling, offering for sale, buying. bartering, soliciting or trading...".
Equality and Access to Justice in the Work of Bertha Wilson 45
91(24) of the Constitution Act 1867 over Indians and Lands reserved
for the Indians is through s. 88 of the Indian Act.u. The judicially
formulated criterion for incorporation of provincial laws of general
application under s. 88 has been described by Professor Marlee Kline
as illustrative of the ethnocentric paradigm in judicial interpretation.2s
According to Professor Kline, it is ethnocentric because it takes the
perspective of the predominantly Anglo-European Canadian legisla-
ture in determining whether a particular piece of provincial legislation
singles out Indians and should therefore be struck down as an invasion
of federal jurisdiction rather than incorporated and made applicable to
Indians. However, an exception to incorporation under s. 88 is pro-
vided in favour of lights established in treaties. Any incorporation is
subject to such rights. Furthermore, in Nowegijick v. the Queen and
Simon v. the Queenz , an interpretive approach to treaties was set out
which directed that they be understood in the sense that the First
Nations understood them and that any ambiguities be resolved in
favour of First Nations rather than of the Crown. Thus, in this narrow
area, an effort has been made to reverse the ethnocentric paradigm, to
stand in the place of the First Nations individual or group when
construing a treaty term. In the hands of the majority, this explicit
direction to recognize the situatedness of what is perceived as reason-
able is ineffective. Justice Cory, writing for the majority, found
himself unable to get around previous judicial interpretations of the
1930 Transfer Agreement that suggested the right to hunt for sport and
commercial purposes was made subject to provincial game laws leav-
ing only a right to hunt for food.V Justice Wilson, writing for a
minority composed of herself, Chief Justice Dickson, and Justice
L'Heureux-Dube, takes a much more vigorous approach to the inter-
pretive direction in the treaty cases. She finds that the domestic versus
commercial hunting distinction is culturally inappropriate from the
First Nations perspective, that hunting for food or subsistence histori-
24. R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, s. 88. Section 88 states: "Subject to the terms of any treaty and any
other Act of the Parliament of Canada, all laws of general application from time to time in force
in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province except to the extent
that such laws am inconsistent with this Act or any order, rule, regulation or by-law made
thereunder, and except to the extent that such laws make provision for any matter for which
provision is made by or under this Act."
25. M. Kline, "Silencing, Ethnocentricity, and Racism: The Paradigmatic Framework of Jack
and Charlie v. The Queen,' (unpublished).
26. [1983] 1 S.C.R. 387 [hereinafterNowegijick].
27. [198512 S.C.R. 387 [hereinafter Simon].
28. Horseman, supra. pp. 932-33.
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cally entailed hunting for barter, and that the mention of "hunting for
food" should not be interpreted to mean only hunting for direct con-
sumption.29
The Horseman case raises serious questions about the potential of
a shift in epistemological stance to transcend the divide in power and
experience between different groups in Canadian society. It does so
not only because of the tenacity of the ethnnocentric paradigm even
when there is a clear direction to shift perspective, but also because
ultimately such a shift, even if successful, is going to leave in place
the overall structure of power. In the Horseman case, that structure is
represented by the governing principle that, before 1982, it was open
to the Crown to unilaterally extinguish the rights agreed to in treaties
so long as it was done clearly. Horseman's argument that any deroga-
tion of rights by the Transfer Agreement is invalid because there was
no approval or consent by the First Nations parties to Treaty 8 is
acknowledged but then ignored. Justice Cory mentions Horseman's
challenge to the Transfer Agreement,1° but, after discussing the prec-
edents, states:
In addition, although it might well be politically and morally unaccept-
able in today's climate to take such a step as that set out in the 1930
Agreement without consultation with and concurrence of the Native
peoples affected, nonetheless the power of the Federal Government to
unilaterally make such a modification is unquestioned and has not been
challenged in this case."
Against that background, the area of interpretive leeway provided
by the Nowegijick and Simon cases seems ultimately paternalistic.
Indeed the non-listening/non-hearing represented by Justice Cory's
statement exposes the futility of endeavouring to achieve a fundamen-
tal transformation of the arrangements of power through discursive
strategies of persuasion, interpretation, and the inclusion of other
voices and narratives.
29. Ibid. pp. 912, 917-921.
30. Ibid. p. 932. Justice Cory summarizes Horseman's argument in this regard as follows.
"Secondly, and most importantly, it is contended that the traditional hunting rights granted to
Indians by Treaty No. 8 could not be reduced or abridged in any way without some form of
approval and consent given by the Indians, the parties most affected by the derogation, and
without some form of compensation or quid pro quo for the reducation in the hunting rights."
Justice Corey suggests that there was in fact a form of quidpro quo provided in the extension of
areas in which Indians could hunt and in the protection from provincial legislation afforded to
means employed by Indians in food hunting. However, Justice Cory never addresses the consent
issue raised by Horseman.
31. Ibid. p. 934.
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II Normative Commitments of the situated knower
While an objectivist epistemology often serves to preserve a hierarchy
of power, an epistemology based on partiality and a recognition of
subjective truths makes it possible for a multitude of different
understandings of community to become visible and claim authority.
I say "possible" because I do not think that inclusion and a democrati-
zation of power necessarily flow from the deconstruction of objectiv-
ity. Indeed, that is the ultimate lesson of Horseman. However,
because the claim of objectivity has been deployed to consolidate
privilege, it is critical in a struggle for social equality to contest that
claim and expose its links with particular social structures. Thus,
within a system that constructs certain positions as different from the
normal or the ordinary or the reasonable, it becomes important to
demonstrate that the normal and the ordinary and the reasonable are
constituted by difference. Justice Wilson begins to do this in Hill,
Morgentaler, Lavallee, and Horseman.
This alternative epistemological stance makes possible a rethink-
ing of the normative assumptions about moral choice and the human
self that underly equality theory. As in Justice Wilson's resistance to
the limits of objectivism, one can trace in her equality jurisprudence
the gradual evolution of an equality theory that is responsive to differ-
ence.
From the beginning of her judicial career, Justice Wilson has been
particularly attuned to claims of exclusion and discrimination. As a
member of the Ontario Court of Appeal, Justice Wilson, sometimes in
dissent and sometimes with the support of one or more of her col-
leagues, wrote in favour of a young girl's claim for admission to a
boy's hockey team,33 for recognition of sexism as a basis for a wrong-
ful dismissal suit,34 and for acknowledgement of the contributions by
common law spouses to the economic wealth of a common law
relationship.3 However, the case from that period which perhaps
most clearly exemplifies her commitment to equality is Bhadauria v.
32. A liberal analysis would claim the opposite and would put. forward an adherence to at least
an ideal of an objective foundation for knowledge as the only way to avoid a politics of
domination. While I think epistemology and politics are linked, I do not think particular kinds of
epistemologies stand in a necessary relationship with particular political visions.
33. Re OntarioHuman Rights Commission et al. and Ontario Rural SoftballAssociation (1979),
26 O.R. (2d) 134 (Wilson 3. dissenting).
34. MacDonald v. 283076 Ontario Inc. (1979). 26 O.R. (2d) I (per curiam).
35. Becker v. Pettkus (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 105, 87 D.L.R.(3d) 101, affd [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834,
117 D.LR. (3d) 257.
48 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Board of Governors of Seneca College26 In that case, the plaintiff,
Bhadauria, brought an action against Seneca College for damages
resulting from the College's allegedly discriminatory treatment of her
application for a teaching position. Bhadauria, a highly qualified
woman of East Indian origin, failed to obtain an interview with the
College for any of the several positions they had advertized. She
alleged that the College's lack of response to her application was
because of her ethnic origin. The issue on appeal was whether she had
a cause of action, i.e. whether there is such a thing as a common law
duty not to discriminate. Justice Wilson found in the affirmative. She
conceded that all the cases in which a right not to be the object of
discrimination was recognised are innkeeper cases dealing with re-
fusal of accommodation and related services. However, rather than
accept the inevitable ethnocentrism of a system built on precedent, she
in effect proposed that it is possible to infer a more contemporary and
inclusive understanding of what the harm of discrimination might
consist of and how and where it might be experienced by looking at
more recent expressions of public policy than the doctrine of innkeep-
ers liability. In a unanimous decision for the Court, Justice Wilson
found that Bhadauria had a cause of action which was strengthened by
the commitments to equality expressed in the preamble to the Ontario
Human Rights Coder rather than displaced by the Code's creation of
statutory remedies.
Justice Wilson's sensitivity to the claims of social groups who are
particularly vulnerable to exploitation and mistreatment because of
prejudice or lack of political voice has also characterized her work as
a member of the Supreme Court of Canada. She has consistently
endeavoured to put in place an analytic framework that is receptive to
equality claims. For example, in a concurring set of reasons in R. v.
Big M Drug Mart,3 she advocated giving primacy to an effects based
test of constitutional harm because of its importance in addressing
systemic inequalities. Likewise, in McKinney v. Board of Governors
of the University of Guelph et al.,39 dissenting on other grounds, she
argued against using the references in s. 15 to equality in relation to
"law", to limit equality protection to legislative violations of the
guarantee. 40
36. (1979) 27 O.R. (2d) 142, 105 D.LR.(3d) 707, rev'd [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181, 124 D.L.R. (3d)
193 (hereinafter Bhadauria).
37. R.S.O. 1970, c. 318.
38. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 18 D.L.R.(4th) 321.
39. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 457,76 D.L.R.(4th) 545 [hereinafter McKinney cited to D.L.R.].
40. Ibid. pp. 600-06.
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Justice Wilson has also been responsive to the equality dimen-
sions of other sections of the Charter and of other constitutional
issues. In Re Singh and Minister of Employment and Immigration,41
Justice Wilson's reasons provide for recognition under the Charter of
the threat to personal security posed by the potentially devastating
consequences of a denial of refugee status to a refugee claimant. Her
stance not only expanded the kinds of injuries that s.7 security of the
person will provide protection against, but also extended s. 7 of the
Charter to one of the least powerful groups within the Canadian
community, namely to those who are neither citizens nor permanent
residents but are simply physically present in Canada. Likewise, in
the course of her concurring reasons in Morgentaler, Justice Wilson
again reveals a sensitivity to the equality dimension of s. 7 claim for
reproductive self determination. She writes that women's struggle for
a place in society has not been a struggle against state oppression but
rather a struggle for legislative reforms "in a man's world" and for the
translation of "women's needs and aspirations" into protected rights
such as the right to reproduce or not to reproduce. 42 Finally, in her
dissenting reasons in McKinney, Justice Wilson refuses to sustain the
limitations on age discrimination protections in the Ontario Human
Rights Code4 because of their impact on workers without private
pension schemes. She points out the high correlation of such schemes
with unionization, the small proportion of the workforce covered by
collective agreements, and the high proportion of immigrant and fe-
male labour in the unorganized sector."
Justice Wilson's willingness to push at the boundaries of law and
to respond to different perspectives when addressing issues of equality
has been a recurrent theme throughout the course of her judicial
career. I would like to suggest, however, that there is a significant
coalescing of ideas which coincides with her last few years at the
Court. Until this point, with the exception of Bhadauria which in
effect exposes the systemic racism implicit in legal reasoning based
on precedent and in the rules of statutory interpretation, Justice
Wilson's equality jurisprudence is directed at a proceduralist notion of
inclusion, e.g. the admission of females to male institutions and the
recognition of the interests and injuries experienced by women and
41. [19851 1 S.C.R. 177,17 D.L.R. (4th) 422 (3-3 decision).
42. Supra. note 9 at 172.
43. S.O. 1981, c. 53.
44. McKinney supra. n. 39 pp. 626-27. See discussion infra. n. 74-80.
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members of minority groups. While these cases represent important
steps in the process of developing a jurisprudence that is more respon-
sive to the diversity of the experiences of oppression within the
Canadian community, they leave in place the essential features of how
the law has conceived of equality. They do not challenge or seek to
transform existing categories. They simply ask for admission, for a
share in benefits, and for access to legal remedies. More importantly,
they are predicated on a notion of sameness and same treatment which
dovetails nicely with an objectivist epistemology. Hockey playing
girls argue that there are objective standards of hockey playing excel-
lence that should be applied to all players regardless of gender. The
way in which the objective standards privilege male associated skills
and behaviour and the wider social phenomenon of the underfunding
and underencouragement of girls sports does not enter into the discus-
sion. Furthermore, from this standpoint, hockey playing boys are
theoretically entitled to play on girls teams for the same reasons.
Thus, hockey playing girls unwittingly become law's latest lads of
parts.
This vision of equality presumes a normative framework in which
the human self is disembodied and separate from social connection,
and thus interchangeable with any other human self in all its essential
aspects. The moral point of view is universalized; it speaks to this
essential, interchangeable self. One's entitlement to respect is based
on the extent to which one is the same as everyone else. The particu-
lars of one's social position and experience are inessential attributes,
have nothing to do with one's humanity. However, as Seyla Benhabib
points out, the universalism of traditional moral theories is
"substitutionalist in that the universalism they defend is defined sur-
reptitiously by identifying the experiences of a specific group of
subjects as the paradigmatic case of the human as such."'4 As she goes
on to point out, "[t]hese subjects are invariably white, male adults who
are propertied or at least professional."' 6
The potentially devasting impact that an equality analysis which
is predicated on a universalistic standpoint can have on socially
marginalized groups has been chronicled with regard to women's
social position by Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day. In particular, they
detail the alarming number of men's sex equality challenges to legis-
45. S. Benhabib, "The Generalized and Concrete Other" in Benhabib and ComeU, Feminism as
Critique at p. 81.
46. Ibid.
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lative attempts to ameliorate the social and economic disadvantage of
women. As Brodsky and Day write,
The theory of equality consistently advanced by male applicants' law-
yers is that men have the right to be treated the same as women. This
formal equality theory is relied upon repeatedly, even in the face of the
most obvious sex-based differences.47
Equality within this framework is regarded as a value neutral
principle which corrects irrational legislative classifications by meas-
uring their inclusiveness or exclusiveness against their purposes. The
focus is on the process by which the law achieves its ends, rather than
the substantive choices made by the law. The cases in which Justice
Wilson most clearly addresses the need to rethink this understanding
of equality and give substance to the proceduralist notion of inclusion,
are Brossard (Ville de) v. Commission des droits de la personne du
Quebec et al.,4 Alberta Human Rights Commission v. Central Alberta
Dairy Pool,49 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, ° and R. v.
Turpin.5 1
Brossard, the first case in the equality quartet, arises under the
section of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms52
which protects against discrimination on the basis of civil status. The
challenge was to a municipality's anti-nepotism hiring policy which
barred all members of the immediate families of full time staff and
councillors from employment with the town. Line Laurin, the com-
plainant, had been disqualified from applying for a job as a lifeguard
with the town because her mother was a full time secretary for the
town police. Most of Beetz J.'s majority decision focuses on whether
this is civil status discrimination, and then on whether, as such, it
nonetheless fits within one of the exemptions in the Quebec Charter.
Justice Wilson agrees with Beetz J.'s position that the anti-nepotism
policy constitutes civil status discrimination and that it does not fit
within the exemptions. However, she takes the trouble to write
47. Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day, Canadian CharterEqualityRightsfor Women: One Steps
Forward or Two Steps Back, (Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women: 1989) at
p.6 1.
48. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 279,53 D.L.R.(4th) 608 (Wilson 1. concurring) [hereinafter Brossard cited
to D.L.R.).
49. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489,72 D.L.R.(4th) 417 (unanimous) [hereinafter Alberta Dairy Pool cited
to D.LR.].
50. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143,56 D.LR.(4th) 3 (Wilson J. for the majority) [hereinafter Andrews cited
to D.LR.].
51. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296,48 C.C.C.(3d) 8 (unanimous) [hereinafter Turpin cited to C.C.C.].
52. R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12, s. 10.
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separate concurring reasons to discuss the kinds of arguments that
employers can make to come within the exemption for "a distinction,
exclusion or preference based on the aptitudes or qualifications re-
quired in good faith for an employment", commonly known as a bona
fide occupational requirement or bfor clause. Of particular concern to
Justice Wilson is the municipality's argument that because of its status
as a public body, impartiality in hiring is particularly important. Her
discussion of the issue is much like her discussion of the ordinary
person in Hill or of reasonableness in Lavallee. She frames it in terms
of a rational connection between the municipality's purposes and the
chosen hiring policy. However, she suggests that what might be
regarded as rational, will be situation specific. As in Lavallee, she
appears willing to move beyond a rigid objective/subjective dualism
and to question, at least implicitly, the link between equality of re-
sponsibility and an objectivist epistemology. For example, she writes:
...Coming closer to home, could a municipality which felt under an
obligation as a public body to hire members of minorities as opposed to
having a totally white Anglo-Saxon or French-Canadian police force
make the applicant's race or national origin a "qualification" within the
meaning of s. 20? I believe that it could if it bonafide believed that the
adoption of such a policy was required in order to satisfy its obligation
to properly police its particular constituency.
5 3
This is a departure from the notion of equality in terms of the
uniform application of neutral standards and of same treatment, and
from a notion of morality in terms of universalizability. The human
self within this framework is a concrete and embodied self whose
cultural and social positioning is acknowledged as an essential part of
the development of a community's moral understandings. Difference
is no longer an inessential atttribute or conversely, the justification for
social inequalities. Instead, difference is the starting point for under-
standing how social structures create and sustain social disparities and
needs. Thus, Brossard makes it possible to consider what has only
been hinted at in the other decisions. If women's integration into
society requires legislative reforms that specifically address women's
current needs, and if systemic racism requires systemic remedies that
set out to alter social, economic and legal structures, then a formal
notion of equality will frustrate rather than support those positive
strategies.
53. Supra. n. 48 at p. 654.
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This dilemma presents itself more fully in Alberta Dairy Pool. In
that case, the Supreme Court revisits an issue which it had dealt with
earlier in Bhinder v. C.N.R. Co..' Like Brossard,, both Bhinder and
Alberta Dairy Pool concerned the operation of human rights schemes
and like the scheme in Brossard, both schemes had some form of the
bfor exemption for employers who have been found to be in violation
of one or more anti-discrimination protections. Bhinder was a Sikh
who refused to wear a hard hat because his religion required him to
wear a turban at all times. The majority at the Supreme Court, with
Justice Wilson's concurrence, found that the employer's hardhat rule
was a bfor and that the employer had no duty to accommodate Bhinder.
In the aftermath of Bhinder, the CHRC described its impact as fol-
lows:
The effect of the Bhinder decision is to ...put the Commission's ability
to achieve its legislatively-defined objective in doubt. This can mean,
for example, that workplaces may not have to be modified to enable
disabled individuals to earn a livelihood; women who become pregnant
and who require temporary modification of their duties may be forced
from their jobs; persons who for religious reasons cannot work regular
business hours may have difficulty finding employment. These are not
merely hypothetical problems. Currently, the Commission is investi-
gating 528 complaints alleging discrimination in employment. Poten-
tially, 33% of the complaints which concern religion or disability and
5% of the complaints dealing with sex discrimination might be affected
by the Bhinder decision 5
In Alberta Dairy Pool, Justice Wilson for a majority found that
Bhinder was correctly decided in so far as a bfor exemption does not
impose a duty to accommodate so long as the discrimination is direct
discrimination. However, she went on to find that it was incorrect to
apply that principle to cases of adverse effect discrimination. In the
latter situation,
...the appropriate response is to uphold the rule in its general applica-
tion and consider whether the employer could have accommodated the
employee adversely affected without undue hardship 6
The significance of Brossard is that it recognised the need for
situation-specific, positive remedies and ensured that human rights
54. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 561 [hereinafter Bhinder].
55. Special Report to Parliament on the Effects of the Bhinder decision on the Canadian Human
Rights Commission, February, 1986, at p. 4, cited in Alberta Dairy Pool, supra., p. 432-33.
56. Supra. n. 49 at p. 436.
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legislation would be interpreted in ways that would not interfere with
those strategies. Alberta Dairy Pool goes further by finding that anti-
discrimination protections in human rights codes require private ac-
tors to engage in positive action to overcome systemic barriers to
equality. Furthermore, the logical link between equality norms and an
objectivist epistemology has once again been challenged. While the
equality of responsibility that Justice Wilson discussed in Hill remains
as an ideal, the suggestion that it can be achieved by the uniform
application of rules which are based on external truths apprehended
through reason is no longer assumed to be incontrovertible. In fact,
such rules are in some situations, identified as the cause of inequali-
ties.
This approach is continued under the Charter in Andrews and in
Turpin. In Andrews, McIntyre J. for the majority described the con-
tent of equality in terms of responding to the social and historical
experiences of group disadvantagement rather than in terms of the
Aristotelian principle of formal equality. Wilson J. expanded on this
shift in understanding as it relates to discrimination against non-
citizens, the central issue in Andrews. In so doing, she focused on the
lack of political power of non-citizens and their consequent vulner-
ability to disadvantagement and exclusion. This concept of equality is
directly tied in her reasons to a methodology that looks at "the context
of the group in the entire social, political and legal fabric of our
society", 7 and which concedes that different historical understandings
of oppression will emerge with "changing political and social circum-
stances."' Again, equality is no longer a function of the neutral
application of uniform standards or of the rationality of legislative
distinctions that distribute benefits and burdens. Rather, it is directly
tied to a substantive notion of political participation and to redressing
the socio-structural conditions of inequality. The point is driven home
in Turpin in which Wilson for the Court emphasizes that s. 15 is about
"remedying or preventing discrimination against groups suffering so-
cial, political and legal disadvantage in our society" 59 rather than the
"mechanical and sterile categorization process"' entailed in the simi-
larly situated test of formal equality.
None of these cases provide us with the complete architecture of a
reconceived notion of equality. Instead, they direct us to consider
57. Supra. n. 50 at p. 32.
58. Ibid. at p. 33.
59. Supra. n. 51 at p. 35.
60. Ibid.
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social and historical relationships between groups and to examine the
substantive arrangements which produce or obstruct social prosperity
and political self determination. They defer to the group's under-
standing of its own culture and needs rather than presuming a uniform
set of priorities which is rooted in reality or in what the reasonable
person would perceive as reality. The idea of a notional benchmark
against which one can measure whether or not true equality has been
achieved or of an equality formula which can be applied to any
situation is relinquished in favour of an ongoing consideration of how
our current social relationships affect the ability of different groups
within the Canadian community to survive and flourish.
The difficulty of giving up the formulaic certainty of an equal-
ity calculus based on legislative rationality is illustrated by R. v.
Nguyen; R. v. Hess 61 , a judgement delivered in the final term of Justice
Wilson's tenure as a Supreme Court judge. While a majority of the
Court in reasons by Justice Wilson disposed of the case under s. 7 of
the Charter, the decision was also the occasion for a discussion of the
meaning of the Andrews and Turpin approach to equality. In Hess,
Justice Wilson for the majority found that the crime of statuory rape
set out in what was then s. 146(1) of the Criminal Code 2 violates s. 7
of the Charter by removing the defence of the mistake of fact as to the
female complainant's age, and that the legislative provision cannot be
justified as a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter. MacLachlin J.
in dissent also found that the provision violated s. 7 but would have
"saved" it under s. 1. She then turned to the question of whether the
provision could also survive a s. 15 challenge. She found that it
violated s. 15 of the Charter, but again, that the violation of rights
could be justified under s. 1.
MacLachlin J.'s discussion at the s. 15 stage rejects the interpreta-
tion of Andrews and Turpin which suggests that equality is exclu-
sively about the socio-structural relationships which produce and sus-
tain the exclusion of certain groups. She makes it clear that, at least
with respect to the enumerated grounds in s. 15, there is no need to
demonstrate the historical and social disadvantagement of the group
represented by the claimant beyond describing the negative impact of
the challenged law. Thus any sexual distinction which burdens men is
constitutionally offensive and must be justified under s. 1 if it is to
survive. The idea that inequalities are a function of complex social
61. (1990), 59 C.C.C. (3d) 161 [hereinafter Hess].
62. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 [am. 1972, c. 13, s. 70; later s. 153(1); since re-en. R.S.C. 1985, c. 19
(3rd Supp.), s.1][now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46].
56 The Dalhousie Law Journal
relationships involving privilege and power is replaced by the more
familiar idea that inequalities are a function of laws that irrationally
single out groups. Furthermore, it appears that it is always irrational
to single out a group or individual on the basis of one of the enumer-
ated grounds in s. 15 in any way that has negative consequences.
Thus, because the enumerated grounds in s. 15 are neutral, i.e. they do
not necessarily link the enumerated characteristics to existing prac-
tices of domination, any attempt to address inequality by changing
those practices is more than likely a violation of the anti-discrimina-
tion rights of the dominators. In light of the absurdity of this result, it
is not surprising that Justice Wilson decided to explain why she could
not agree with MacLachlin J.'s interpretation of s. 15.
Justice Wilson reasons take issue with MacLachlin J.'s assump-
tion that any sexual distinction that has a negative impact will offend
s. 15. Justice Wilson begins by recalling the position in Andrews "that
it was not every difference in treatment that would result in inequal-
ity"63 and the emphasis in Turpin on the importance of looking "not
only at the impugned legislation that had created the challenged dis-
tinction but also at the larger social, political and legal context".'
However, rather than embarking on the contextualized discussion
suggested by the previous cases, she finds that the statutory rape
provisions do not violate s. 15 of the Charter because the offence
requires penetration, a physical act which only males are biologically
capable of performing and which only women are biologically capa-
ble of having done to them. Justice Wilson bases the biological limits
of penetration on a Code definition which equates sexual intercourse
with penetration and which describes the latter as occurring "notwith-
standing that seed is not emitted." 65 Her reasoning seems to represent
a reversion to the pre- Charter equality analysis in Bliss v. Attorney-
General of Canada.6 In that case, Stella Bliss tried to argue that the
provision of lesser benefits to pregnant women than to other workers
under the Unemployment Insurance Act67 violated the equality protec-
tions in the Canadian Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court in a decision
by Ritchie J. found that "any inequity in between the sexes in this area
is not created by legislation but by nature." In effect, because only
women can become pregnant, pregnancy discrimination does not raise
63. Supra. n. 61 at p. 178.
64. Ibid.
65. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.34, ss. 3(6) [rep. & sub 1980-81-82-83, c. 125, a. 5].
66. [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183.
67. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48.
68. Supra. n.62, p.190.
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a sex equality issue, as long as all pregnant women are treated alike.
So long as the law matches nature, any distinctions it makes are
rational. According to this analysis, MacLachlin J.'s reasons in Hess
are wrong because the statutory rape provision is consistent with what
reasonable persons would agree is true about male and female biol-
ogy. By limiting the class of accused persons to males, the legislation
does not commit the error of underinclusiveness because females are
biologically incapable of the act of penetration. Thus there is a
rational connection between the sexual distinction which singles out
men and the legislative purpose of criminalizing heterosexual inter-
course with certain females. As long as law matches nature, a sex
based classification will be rational. The fact that nature here is the
creation of the Criminal Code's definition of sexual intercourse rather
than some immutable external truth which the law merely reflects
becomes buried in the classification exercise.
The circularity of this line of reasoning was criticized and rejected
by the Court in Andrews and Turpin. In those cases there seemed to be
an awareness of the ease with which a rational classification approach
to equality can be manipulated by simply articulating the law's pur-
pose in terms of the affected class, here by defining penetration in
terms of something only men can do to women, and then stating the
law's purpose in terms of preventing it from happening to young girls.
In light of the commitment in Andrew and Turpin to move beyond an
understanding of equality in terms of rational classification to an
understanding aimed at redressing social disadvantagement, one would
have expected the emphasis in Hess to have been on whether men are
a socially disadvantaged group, on what the experiences of men and
women in determining their sexual lives has been, and on whether the
statutory rape offence perpetuates or ameliorates historical and social
inequalities between men and women. As Professors Isabel Grant and
William Black point out in a comment on Hess, the answers would not
have been easily arrived at, particularly with regard to the exclusion of
young males from protection.69 In addition, the female stereotype
69. W. Black and L Grant, "Equality and Biological Difference" (1990). 79 C.R. (3d) 372.
While female children are more often victims of sexual assault than male children, the latter
figure significantly in the data collected on child sexual abuse. The Badgeley Report on Sexual
Offenses Against Children in Canada (1984) found that one in two females and one in three
males have been victims of one or more unwanted sexual acts. Statistics Canada's Juristat
Service Bulletin, May 7, 1991 reports that about twice as many girls as boys are sexually
assaulted. The characterization of the omission of young males from protection against rape as
a s. 15 equality issue, would raise a question about remedies, namely should the Court remove
the protection altogether, leaving all children at greater risk, or extend the protection to male
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which underlies the statutory rape provision, that young women are
passive, vulnerable victims unable to determine their sexual lives,
might also complicate an assessment of the social impacts of the
provision.70
Professors Grant and Black suggest that there are hints of such
considerations in Justice Wilson's reasons. They mention her refer-
ence to "policy reasons" for limiting protection to females and to the
prohibition of other forms of male experienced penetration, namely
sodomy and buggery, elsewhere in the Code. I would agree with them
that it would make much more sense to interpret Justice Wilson's
decision in Hess as implicitly taking account of the larger social and
historical contexts of sexual inequality. However, the absence of any
such discussion is evidence of the tenacity of a concept of equality in
terms of a comparison between law and truth rather than in terms of
confronting and resisting practices of domination.
In spite of the troubling messages of the Hess decision, the equal-
ity quartet remains as the foundation of a jurisprudence that strives
toward what writers have variously called social equality, substantive
equality, or equality of result. At the core is the notion that equality is
about the disadvantagement of social groups who are defined not
simply by the fact that they share a personal characteristic but by the
fact that the difference in question has been the occasion for the
oppression and exclusion of the group generally from social participa-
tion. It follows from this that the concrete experiences of group
oppression rather than the individual experience of denial or differen-
tial treatment by a particular law or practice, define and give legiti-
macy to equality claims.The approach taken by the equality quartet
can be viewed as requiring both an epistemological and normative
shift. It is an approach that challenges us to examine the epistemologi-
cal move whereby particular knowledges are presented as universal
children. The former results in equality of victimization and seems absurdly formalistic. The
latter raises the spectre of courts exercising legislative functions. See Schachter v. The Queen
(1988), 66 D.LR. (4th) 635 (EC.A.), lv. to appeal to S.C.C. granted Nov. 15, 1990 which dealt
with the issue of remedies for unconstitutional underinclusiveness in the provision of legislative
benefits.
70. Professor Frances Olsen, in "Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis"
(1984), 63 Texas Law Review 387, summarizes feminist objections to statutory rape laws as
follows: "First, as an effort to control the sexual activities of young women, statutory rape laws
are an unwarranted governmental intrusion in to their lives and an oppressive restriction on their
freedom of action....Feminists' second common objection to statutory rape laws is ideological.
Gender-based statutory rape laws reinforce the sexual stereotype of men as aggressors and
women as passive victims. The laws perpetuate the double standard of sexual morality." Ibid.
pp. 404-405.
Equality and Access to Justice in the Work of Bertha Wilson 59
truths, and to question the normative ideal of a disembodied, autono-
mous self. Looking back to the Ontario Hockey Association's exclu-
sion of girls from boys hockey teams which began this account, the
quartet seems to represent a crossing over into a different conceptual
terrain.
However, difficult questions remain. Just as the underlying thesis
of formal equality is a comparison which requires conformity with
existing social arrangements, a shift to a social equality approach may
also require conformity to a single and dominant notion of social
prosperity which is equally assimilationist. In other words, if our
project is access to justice through a more responsive equality dis-
course, at some point we have to examine the cultural and social
norms embedded in our concept of disadvantagement which increas-
ingly is presented as the benchmark of a social equality approach. The
assumption so far, has been that experiences of difference can be
mediated through language, and are in fact mediated through legal
language by courts in equality litigation and in other litigation con-
texts where the participants speak from differing social positions. My
analysis has examined the ways in which legal language and reason-
ing reinforce a social hierarchy based on difference. In addition, it
examines the ways in which equality discourse might become less
exclusionary and more effective in dismantling those hierarchies, in
part through a focus on social disadvantagement rather than irrational
classification. At a minimum, however, the transformative potential
of equality discourse presumes an agreement with regard to the kinds
of social goods that are fundamental to social prosperity. It is at this
point that one is greeted with the same circularity that characterizes
the formal equality riddle. The lack of certain social goods is the
indicator of social disadvantagement. However, definition of the
social goods which inform a particular culture's ideal of community is
a quintessentially political process. Individual and group acceptance
in the sense of belonging to the culture and sharing in its vision of
human wholeness and prosperity, requires meaningful participation in
the process of definition. To the extent that such participation is non-
existent or largely formal, those who are advantaged by current
arrangements of political power will control the definition of
disadvantagement. Within legal discourse the control is both institu-
tionalized, in the sense that the courts and access to litigation remain
in the hands of the privileged, as well as embedded in the strategems
and categories of legal reasoning. Inclusiveness within this frame-
work means assimilation or at least deference to those who ultimately
control meanings, rather than empowerment in the process of self and
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community definition. An equality discourse that seeks to challenge
this seemingly unbreakable circle of power would have to place the
focus on social disadvantagement in the context of a wider project to
challenge the barriers to political self determination. In this respect,
First Nations political struggles which have used not only the lan-
guage of rights but also the language of self-government, title to land,
and division of powers, and a multitude of different fora to pursue
those claims, provide a useful strategic model.
III Methodological Strategies
In Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.),71 Justice Wilson takes time to
discuss the significance of preferring a contextual rather than an
abstract methodology in analysing the Charter. She writes:
...One virtue of the contextual approach, it seems to me, is that it
recognizes that a particular right or freedom may have a different value
depending on the context. It may be, for example, that freedom of
expression has greater value in a political context than it does in the
context of disclosure of the details of a matrimonial dispute. The
contextual approach attempts to bring-into sharp relief the aspect of the
right or freedom which is truly at stake in the case as well as the
relevant aspects of any values in competition with it.2
Contextualization is an effective strategy for counteracting the
universalizing of experience implicit in an objectivist epistemology.
It is one way of exposing what is left out by the assumption that there
is one model for human ideals and one method for achieving them.
The underlying suggestion in Justice Wilson's reasons in Hill and
Lavallee that what appears to be reasonable is a function of social
context is strengthened by her attentiveness to detail in the stories of
the central actors. Thus in Lavallee, the suggestion that it was reason-
able for Lyn Lavallee to defend herself by shooting Kevin Rust as he
left the room is supported by a detailed account of Lavallee's actual
situation as well as an exploration of the social phenomenon of male
violence towards women.
This has two consequences. The first is that it provides a way of
counteracting the negative effects of what Sandra Harding calls
victimology. While the social profile of violence reveals its gendered
71. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [hereinafter Ednonton Journal cited to D.LR.].
72. Ibid. p. 584.
73. S. Harding, "Introduction: Is there a Feminist Method?" in Harding (ed.), Feminism and
Methodology (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), at pp. 1-14.
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nature with women for the most part playing the role of victim, close
attention to the stories of Lavallee and others shifts attention to the
strength, ingenuity, and compassion of the women who manage to
survive under extraordinary conditions of abuse. Thus, it is not a
question of forgiving Lavallee because she was rendered helpless by
her relation to Rust and to the sex/gender system, but of acknowledg-
ing that she was making sense of her individual and social position.
The second consequence of using a contextualized methodology
is that it transforms the way we define legal issues. It does not simply
correct an imbalance by adding some more voices to the debate over
whose context should count the most in a particular legal dispute.
Rather it changes the content of debate and the nature of the debate's
resolution. In other words, a contextualized methodology is not "just
method". It goes beyond being "just method" to the extent that it
changes how we understand what is happening in a legal dispute. The
McKinney case provides an example. In McKinney, one of the
issues faced by the Court was whether a provision in the Ontario
Human Rights Code which limited the protection against age dis-
crimination to those persons who are between the ages of 18 and 65
could be justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit on
equality rights. The age based exception to the Code protection
permitted among other things the enforcement of mandatory retire-
ment at age 65. The occasion for the litigation was a series of
challenges to the mandatory retirement policies of several various
Ontario universities. While the other Justices who wrote reasons in
McKinney extensively survey the social and economic interests in the
name of which the respondents sought to justify the legislation, only
Justice Wilson applies the same contextualized methodolgy to the
interests which were represented by the equality protection. In so
doing, she does not limit herself to the actual claimants before her but
examines the impacts of the age limits on social groups other than
university professionals. She points out that while it is true that
mandatory retirement is often part of a larger package of employee
benefits and makes it easier to design pension schemes, it is generally
only a small proportion of workers, namely unionized workers, who
are able to obtain such packages. Furthermore, the unorganized sector
of the labour force is dominated by female, immigrant and unskilled
workers who will have very few resources to fall back on if they are
barred from employment after age 65. In effect, the substantial and
compelling objective of the legislation is only substantial and compel-
74. Supra. n. 39.
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ling if you are standing in the shoes of a small group of comparatively
privileged workers. Justice Wilson goes on to point out that even in
the organized sector, female workers often cannot acquire sufficient
pension credits before age 65 to adequately provide for themselves on
retirement, because "of the high incidence of interrupted work histo-
ries due to child bearing and child rearing. ' 75
While introducing and giving substance to the interests of the
constituents who are perhaps the most vulnerable to age discrimina-
tion does not solve the problem of whose interest should prevail in this
situation, it might very well change how we regard a solution. Deci-
sions such as McKinney no longer represent the triumph of individual
rights or the triumph of community interests, but rather consist of a
qualified and perhaps inherently limited and tentative resolution of
social needs. Both the individual and the community become less
monolithic, reveal themselves as complex intersections of interests.
In addition, because the discussion is grounded in the actual social
arrangements which have created the conflict, it can always be reo-
pened. A discussion which is portrayed as a clash of abstract values
or as a clash between abstract values and policy considerations, is
much less likely to be renegotiated.
Justice Wilson is well aware of the risks of such an approach. In
Edmonton Journal she observes that positions that are articulated in
abstract, conceptual terms tend to be accorded more importance and
authority. It becomes "difficult to imagine"76 compromising them.
However, it also becomes difficult to imagine solutions which take
account of the practical impacts of what an infringement of the right or
a judicial repeal of the legislation will mean. By contextualizing and
grounding the discussion in individual and social realities, one may
distort the context, leave out stories, or simply not understand what is
being recounted. But at least one has moved away from the notion of
a single authoritative account.
Finally, contextualization is integral to the development of a re-
vised understanding of equality. The normative shift which takes
place in Justice Wilson's most recent equality decisions is impossible
without a contextualized methodology. In many ways, it is what
replaces the similarly situated test rejected by Andrews and Turpin.
Instead of a doctrinal formula, those cases present us with a method.
We are in effect told that we will not understand what equality entails
until we have listened to and examined the particular stories of the
75. McKinney, p. 627.
76. Supra. n. 71 atp. 581.
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claimants and the wider contexts within which they live. The reasons
for decision make some references to human dignity, non-discrimina-
tion, and respect for individuals and groups, but we are left to deter-
mine what that means by paying attention to history and social experi-
ence. The openendedness is disconcerting. It generates a form of
conceptual vertigo. What looks like equality in one situation, will,
given a different spin, look like inequality. Meanwhile, however, the
attention to context brings into solid focus the very concrete ways in
which we experience social relationships. It provides another kind of
sense or logic as the justification of particular outcomes.
IV A Conclusion and Some Beginnings
In this essay, I have tried to set out what I consider to be the potential
of Justice Wilson's jurisprudence to confront our assumptions and to
provide us with a more articulated vision of social justice. That
potential presents itself in the form of courageous dissent, tentative
glimpses, and careful argumentation. However, the most striking
aspect of Justice Wilson's persistent effort to make justice both equal
and accessible, is her search for new frameworks for understanding
and celebrating difference. Within law, this means developing new
epistemological, normative, and methodological understandings. I
have left many questions unanswered. In particular, there is the
question of what provides courts with institutional legitimacy if we
can no longer justify decisions by reference to objective rational
principles. Should we look more closely at court structures, account-
ability, and the composition of courts if we are going to take the
position that historical and experiential differences count? Should we
challenge the assumption that the concept of disadvantagement which
lies at the heart of the social equality approach is somehow neutral,
somehow transcends or cures the power imbalances between equality
claimants and the institutions which define the content of an equality
claim? Justice Wilson's decisions consistently refuse to obscure the
systemic nature of inequality, and the participation of the structures of
legal discourse in those systems. As a result, the questions she raises
are complex and difficult, and yet they are never presented as impos-
sible. On the contrary, by pushing us to re-examine assumptions, by
bringing voices at the margins into the center, and by demanding
answers that respond to the logic of context as well as the logic of
principle, she has made available to us a new array of possibilities. No
doubt she will continue that project as a writer, a jurisprudential
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thinker, and a contributor to current discussions of equality and jus-
tice. So we find ourselves on her retirement from the Supreme Court
of Canada, the beneficiaries not only of a legacy of insightful and
compassionate decisions, but also of a whole new set of beginnings.
